CIAF follows a relative value strategy methodology based on industry analysis. The conecpt is related to "relative value arbitrage" employed by many succesful hedge funds in that its long positions reflect areas of unrealized relative value in industries deemed attractive to the fund manager via microeconomic analysis. Present and plausible future metrics are estimated and compared. At the moment, it is strictly "long only". In the future, some offsetting bearish ETF positiosn might be considered for hedging purposes, however the fund should still be expected to be "mostly long". The fund does invest in smaller companies, so volatility and beta may be higher. Selling criteria is reached if a position gets to the top end of an industry's typical value metrics corridor. Some special situations are held longer until the underlying equity story unfolds. A "Thematic Network" concept is employed. Right now "Oil & Gas", "Industrial Growth stories", "Rule Breaking Telecoms", "Generic Pharmas" and occasional techstocks with a promising future are the fund's major focus. This fund chiefly follows a microeconomic approach. In addition, special situations (recapitalization, spin-outs, etc.) are being pursued. If an industry gets out of favour fundamentally, it's de-emphasized and the folio reshuffled. The folio manager cannot predict the market, so the fund tries to find undervalued niches in interesting industries. This "value" and "growth at a reasonable price" approach has performed nicely during the techstock crash, the 2002-2003 "impasse" and the "Great Recession" of 2008-2009 with its prolongued digestion period. Personally, I often compare the "financial crisis of 2008/2009" with the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of more than 10 years before. While the events triggering the economic shocks were certainly different, the kind of shock (a "liquidity shock") in both cases was very similar. The more flexible countries (South Korea, Taiwan, China) came out of the AFC within 18 months and emerged stronger. As the US economy has avoided a replay of a 1930ies Depression scenario with the help of the FED's unconventional monetarist QE policies, the market might underappreciate yet again, how smooth the US economy, could have adjusted to a post-fallout trajectory of moderate growth in 2014 and beyond.